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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wally Kay Schultz attempts to appeal from' the judgment and sentence 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. 
Because Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal within 42 days of from the 
judgment of conviction as required by I.A.R. 14, his appeal is untimely and 
should be dismissed. Alternatively, his conviction and sentence should be 
affirmed 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
On May 2, 2005, Lieutenant Kindig and Deputy Moore of the Minidoka 
County Sheriff's Office responded to Schultz's residence to investigate a report of 
domestic violence. (#33256' Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17; p.12, Ls.2-20; p.34, Ls.3- 
22; p.39, L.15 - p.41, L.1; p.56, Ls.16-17.) Schultz's live-in girlfriend, Laurie 
Morrill, called 9-1-1 and reported being beaten at Schultz's residence. (#33256 
Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17; p.11, Ls.16-18; p.12, Ls.2-20; p.34, Ls.3-22; p.82, L.7 - 
p.83, L.6; p.85, Ls.14-16; p.87, Ls.9-11; p.95, L.22; p.100, Ls.5-14; p.120, Ls.6- 
17.) 
The officers arrived at Schultz's residence within minutes of receiving the 
9-1-1 call and Lieutenant Kindig went to talk to Schultz who was standing outside 
' Supreme Court Docket No. 33255 is a consolidated appeal of two unrelated 
Minidoka County cases involving Schultz: Case No. CR-2005-884 ("Drug case") 
and CR-2005-01139 ("Battery case"). (Supreme Court Docket No. 33255, Order 
Granting Motion To Consolidate Appeals dated September 27, 2006.) Because 
Schultz does not appeal any issues related to the Drug case (Appellant's brief, 
p.l), the state has cited solely to the record of the Battery case which, prior to 
consolidation, was marked and identified as Supreme Court Docket No. 33256. 
about "50 yards into the wrecking yard from the front of the house." (#33256 
Trial Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.9, L.3.) Deputy Moore went into the house where he found 
Laurie sobbing. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.lO; p.1 I ,  Ls.16-18; p.12, 
L.7.) He noticed her clothes "were in disarray, she was bleeding from her nose" 
and trying to wipe the blood off of her face. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.12, Ls.5-10.) 
Laurie told the officer that Schultz kicked and hit her. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.12, 
L.25-p.13, L.1; p.22, Ls.21-22; p.94, Ls.1-13.) 
Observing injuries to Laurie's face and her arm, Deputy Moore called for 
emergency medical assistance. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.22., Ls.12-16.) After the 
EMT examined Laurie's injuries, which included a bloody nose, scratches and 
bruising on her left arm and swelling in her right knee and shin area, the officer 
took some photographs. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.13, L.8 - p.14, L.8, p.14, L.25 - 
p.15, L.14; p.59, Ls.7-19; p.61, Ls.4-6; p.62, Ls.11-13; p.63, L.15 - p.64, L.5; 
p.65, Ls.4-7; p.102, Ls.3-19; p.104, Ls.4-9; Trial Exhibits 1 -2, 8-10,) 
Schultz was arrested and charged with felony domestic violence. (#33256 
R., pp.47-48.) At trial, a jury found Schultz guilty. (#33256 R., p.lOO.) On 
December 15, 2005, the district court entered judgment and imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years with five years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#33256 R., pp.151-55; #33256 Augmented 
Tr., p.105, Ls.21-24.) After a jurisdictional review hearing, the district court 
entered an order on May 22, 2006, suspending the previously pronounced 
sentence and placing Schultz on probation for five years. (#33256 R., p.162; 
#33256 Augmented Tr., p.Tl1, Ls.21-24.) Three days later the court entered an 
"Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing, I.C. § 19-2601(4)" detailing the conditions 
of Schultz's previously imposed five-year probation. (#33256 R., pp.162-68.) 
Schultz filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 2006 (#33256 R., pp.171-73), timely 
only from the "Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" entered May 25, 2006. 
ISSUES 
Schultz states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct necessitating a new trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal and adds the following issue: 
1. Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider Schultz's appellate claims 
because Schultz failed to timely file his notice of appeal from the judgment of 
conviction? 
2. If this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of Schultz's appeal, 
has Schultz failed to show he is entitled to relief with respect to any of his claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Consider Schultz's A~pea l  
Because Schultz Failed To Timely File His Notice Of A~pea l  From 
The Oriqinal Judqment Of Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Schultz asks this Court to vacate his conviction for felony domestic 
battery, alleging violations of his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.6,18.) 
This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Schultz's appellate claim, however, 
because Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal either within 42 days of the 
entry of judgment or within 42 days of the district court's order placing him on 
probation following the period of retained jurisdiction. Schultz's appeal is 
untimely and must be dismissed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Enqineerinq. Inc. v. ldaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 ldaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
C. Schultz's Appeal Is Untimelv And Must Be Dismissed 
The ldaho Appellate Rules govern the time and manner in which appeals 
to the ldaho Supreme Court must be filed. With respect to appeals from the 
district court, I.A.R. 14(a) provides: 
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of 
right from the district court may be made only by physically filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days 
from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court 
on any judgment, order or decree of the district court appealable as 
a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. ... In a criminal case, 
the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time the 
district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to ldaho Code. 
When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the 
defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall 
commence to run. 
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). A timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to 
appellate jurisdiction. I.A.R. 21; State v. Pavan, 128 ldaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. 
App. 1996); State v. Fuller, 104 ldaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). The 
failure to file a notice of appeal within the time limits prescribed by the appellate 
rules requires "automatic dismissal" of the appeal. I.A.R. 21. 
The district court entered judgment against Schultz on December 15, 
2005, imposed a unified sentence of ten years with five years fixed, suspended 
the sentence and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#33256 R., pp.151-55; 
#33256 Augmented Tr., p.105, Ls.21-24.) On May 22, 2006, the district court 
entered an order suspending Schultz's sentence and placing him on probation for 
a period of five years. (#33256 R., p.162; #33256 Augmented Tr., p.111, Ls.21- 
24.) Three days later, on May 25, 2006, the court entered a more detailed "Order 
Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" memorializing the conditions of Schultz's five- 
year period of probation. (#33256 R., pp.162-68.) Schultz did not file his notice 
of appeal until July 6, 2006 (#33256 R., pp.171-73) - 45 days after the court 
entered its order placing Schultz on probation following the period of retained 
jurisdiction. When the time for appeal is calculated from the date the district 
court actually placed Schultz on probation, Schultz's appeal from the judgment is 
not timely. See e.q., State v. Justice, 122 ldaho 407, 834 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
Schultz did timely file his notice of appeal from the district court's "Order 
Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" entered on May 25, 2006. (#33256 R., pp.171- 
73.) The timeliness of Schultz's appeal from this Order, however, does not 
confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the issues Schultz raises on appeal. 
For that, Schultz would have had to raise these issues in a timely appeal from 
May 22, 2006, the date the court placed Schultz on probation. See I.A.R. 14(a) 
(The time to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction is enlarged only by 
the length of time the court actually retains jurisdiction). The court's subsequent 
order entered on May 25, 2006, simply sets forth the specific conditions of 
Schultz's probation, it does not "extend the period for filing an appeal [from the 
judgment of conviction] or begin that period anew." See Payan, 128 ldaho at 
867, 920 P.2d at 83 (entry of an amended judgment does not necessarily "extend 
the period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew.") Schultz's appeal 
would only be considered timely if he challenged matters actually altered by the 
"Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing;" he has not raised any such issue on 
appeal. The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address matters 
unaffected by that subsequent order. See e.q. Walton, Inc, v. Jensen, 132 ldaho 
716, 720, 979 P.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. 1999); m, 128 ldaho at 867,920 P.2d 
at 83. 
Because Schultz now raises claims pertaining only to his right to a fair trial 
his notice of appeal, filed more than 42 days after the jurisdictional period to file 
his appeal was enlarged pursuant to I.A.R. 14, is untimely. Appellate review of 
Schultz's conviction and sentence is therefore precluded. See e.a. Pavan, 128 
ldaho at 867, 920 at 83 (citing State v. War~ i ,  119 ldaho 292, 805 P.2d 498 (Ct. 
App. 1991)) (direct review of judgment and sentence precluded where original 
judgment contained all the terms defendant challenged, but where appeal was 
timely only from amended judgment that did not alter any of those terms). 
The ldaho Court of Appeals recognized in m that "[tlhe period of 
appeals for all criminal defendants in this state must be enforced uniformly." j& 
at 867, 920 P.2d at 83. Like Payan, Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal 
within the jurisdictional period set forth in I.A.R. 14(a), and the issuance of the 
"Order Upon 180-day Review Hearing," which did not alter any of the terms of the 
original judgment, did not extend the time for appeal. Because Schultz's appeal 
is not timely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it and it must be dismissed. 
I.A.R. 21; m, 128 ldaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83. 
II. 
Schultz Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
A. Introduction 
Schultz argues that the prosecutor made two comments during closing 
argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.) 
Schultz has failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he has 
failed to establish that his due process rights were violated as a result of any 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 
B. Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governina Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero- 
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[lit is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwriaht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 ($982) ("[Tjhe touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."). In that regard, the 
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the 
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other 
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain 
silent." at 181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly 
overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the 
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be 
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider 
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's 
ability to judge the evidence fairly." Id. at 11-12. Consistent with Darden and 
m, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to 
result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing 
argument the Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of 
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; 
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and 
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations 
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a 
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an 
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a 
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from 
the plethora of less damaging interpretations. 
Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep 
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, I I 1  ldaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 
(1986)). The ldaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[tlhe right to due 
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and 
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for 
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Application of the foregoing standards to Schultz's claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial, 
C. Schultz Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Allesation That The Prosecutor 
Ensased In Misconduct Bv comment in^ On His Silence 
At trial, Schultz's counsel contended Schultz acted out of self-defense 
(#33256 Augmented Tr., p.69, L.24 - p.,70, L.2); Schultz did not testify. During 
closing, the prosecutor argued: 
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be 
self-defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this 
case, and particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and 
that would be the testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified 
about it. There wasn't any other testimony about it because there 
were only two people present: Laurie Morrill and the defendant. 
(#33256 Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14.) Schultz's counsel did not object. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Nevertheless, Schultz now contends this statement by 
the prosecutor abridged "his right to silence, his right to a fair trial, and his right to 
due process of law" (Appellant's brief, p.8 (footnotes omitted)), because, Schultz 
claims, it suggests he "should be found guilty because he did not take the 
witness stand to refute Ms. Morrill's testimony" (Appellant's brief, p.10). Schultz's 
argument fails because this comment by the prosecutor can be viewed equally 
as a comment not on Schultz's silence or his failure to testify, but as a comment 
on the state of the evidence. 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the 
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. State v. Pavne, --- P.3d ---, 2008 WL 2447447 *12 (Idaho 2008); 
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Phillips, 
144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of the 
prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors 
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 
816 P.2d 1002,1007 (Ct. App. 1991). 
While it is undoubtedly true that a prosecutor may not comment on a 
defendant's silence or his failure to testify to infer guilt, State v. Strouse, 133 
ldaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), when rebutting a defendant's claim of self- 
defense, a prosecutor's argument that the state's evidence is uncontradicted 
does not constitute such an impermissible reference where "witnesses other than 
the defendant could have contradicted the evidence." State v. McMurry, 143 
ldaho 312, 314-15, 143 P.3d 400, 402-03 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. 
Hod~es, 105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1054, 1055 (1983)). The prosecutor's 
comments must be viewed in light of the evidence presented to the jury, and the 
Court should not "lightly infer . . . the most damaging meaning" or assume the 
jury "dr[e]w that meaning from ... less damaging interpretations." DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. at 647. Rather, as explained in State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 449- 
50, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (Ct. App. 1991), "the propriety of a given argument 
will depend largely upon the facts of each case" and the prosecutor may properly 
present argument based on the evidence in the record. 
Schultz asserts the prosecutor's comment was an impermissible comment 
on his decision not to testify. Despite not objecting to this comment at trial or 
requesting the court admonish the jury to disregard it, Schultz now claims the 
comment was "so egregious andlor inflammatory that any consequent prejudice 
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury 
that the comments should be disregarded." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Contrary to 
Schulz's contention, a fair reading of the prosecutor's statement in this case is 
not that it was made to ask the jury to infer Schultz's guilt from his failure to 
testify. Rather, the prosecutor's statement expressly called attention to the "five 
things that have to be present in order for there to be self-defense" and the 
absence of any evidence indicating Schultz hit and kicked Ms. Morrill out of self- 
defense. 
While Schultz's reasonable belief in the need to act in self-defense could 
have been shown through his testimony at trial, evidence of his alleged self- 
defense could also have been shown by circumstantial evidence through the 
testimony of other witnesses. For example, the officer who observed Schultz in 
response to the 9-1-1 call could have testified as to whether he observed any 
scratches or injuries to Schultz or whether Schultz's clothing appeared ripped or 
torn. The prosecutor's comment was a fair comment on the state of the evidence 
and the insufficiency of the evidence, in general, to demonstrate Schultz's 
reasonable belief in the necessity to defend himself. As the context of the 
prosecutor's closing argument reflects, this statement simply encouraged the jury 
to weigh the evidence of self-defense and reject it. (#33256 Augmented Tr., 
p.52, Ls.7-22.) Given the two possible interpretations of the prosecutor's 
argument regarding the lack of evidence contradicting Laurie's testimony, the 
Court cannot conclude that the prosecutor's comment was "manifestly intended 
or ... of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be 
a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315, 
143 P.3d 402 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the prosecutor's argument that no 
evidence existed as to Schultz's claim of self-defense was not an improper 
comment on Schultz's failure to testify. Because the prosecutor's argument was 
proper, Schultz has failed to show error, fundamental error, or a violation of due 
process. 
D. The Prosecutor's Request For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct 
In his closing argument the prosecutor also commented, in relevant part: 
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of 
giving out hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to 
know that the system works. Show her the system works. You can 
protect Laurie Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the 
evidence and returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the 
defendant accountable. I ask you to do that. 
(Augmented Trial Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.64, 1.6.) Despite not objecting to this 
statement at trial, Schultz argues on appeal it was improper because, he claims, 
it appeals to the jurors' passions and emotions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.) 
Specifically, Schultz contends this statement "encouraged the jury to reach a 
guilty verdict based on sympathy for Ms. Morrill, a desire to protect her from 
further abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence problems." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although he is correct that prosecutors are prohibited 
from using inflammatory tactics to appeal to the emotions of the jury, State v. 
Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007). Schultz has nevertheless 
failed to establish that the prosecutor's statement of which he complains in this 
case was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against the defendant," such that the statement rises to the level of 
fundamental error. State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 
(1994), auoted in State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 
(2003). In support of his argument, Schultz seems to rely upon United States v. 
th . Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9 Clr. 2005)' State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 
P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 
2007), State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998), State v. 
m, 122 ldaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Baruth, 107 
ldaho 651, 691 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984). These cases either do not stand for 
the proposition Schultz claims or are easily distinguishable. 
In Weatherspoon, on several occasions throughout closing argument the 
prosecutor improperly asked the jurors to alleviate the social problem of felons 
possessing semiautomatic handguns by convicting the defendant, even though 
the court had admonished the prosecutor on several occasions to confine his 
comments to whether the defendant was guilty. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 
1149. On appeal the Ninth Circuit concluded that because there was no 
evidence admitted regarding the number of felons who own firearms, the trial 
court failed to give proper curative instructions, and the repeated appeals urged 
conviction solely on the basis of fear and emotion, the comments were improper 
and prejudiced Weatherspoon. Id. 
The statements in this case are different than those in Weatherspoon. 
Here, the prosecutor did not make repeated statements about protecting society 
throughout closing argument in violation of court admonishments. Also, the 
comment in Schultz's case did not appeal to the emotions of the jurors, but 
instead merely requested the jury to fulfill its duty and "show ... the system works 
... by weighing the evidence and returning a just and correct verdict." 
Finally, in Weatherspoon, the court failed to give proper curative instructions 
upon request of the defendant. Here, the defendant did not object or request any 
curative instruction; also, prior to deliberations, the district court instructed the 
jury to apply the law to the facts, based upon the evidence presented, and that 
counsels' arguments were not evidence. (#33256 Augmented Trial Tr., p.37, 
L.17 - p.38, L.23; Jury Instruction Nos., 10 and 11.) 
Also, in Phillips, over defense counsel's objections, the prosecutor 
repeatedly suggested to the jury during closing argument that they "might feel 
irritated and upset" by the testimony of a witness in the case. Id. at 89, 156 P.3d 
at 588. The Court of Appeals agreed with Phillips that the prosecutor's argument 
was inflammatory and "seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions" 
against a particular witness. Id. 
In contrast to the inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor in 
Phillips, the prosecutor's isolated remark in this case was neither inflammatory 
nor obviously calculated to appeal to the jury's passion or emotion. In fact, there 
was nothing about the statement that would have influenced the jury, either 
subtly or overtly, to determine Schultz's guilt based on anything other than the 
evidence presented at trial. See Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. 
Nor was the comment "so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing 
the jury that the comments should be disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 
561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 2001), ~uo ted  in Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 
280, 77 P.3d at 969. 
Schultz's reliance on Beebe, Pecor, Piete and is also misplaced. 
Contrary to Schultz's assertions, this is not a case where the prosecutor 
mischaracterized Schultz's defense to appeal to concerns about protecting the 
public. Compare State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(prosecutor's comment suggesting that the defendant claimed he should be 
"allowed to commit crimes" because he was mentally ill was fundamental, 
reversible error). This is also not a case where the prosecutor made "reference 
to the jurors' families and hypothesized the commission of a crime against them." 
Compare State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(prosecutor's comment to the jury that defendant "is the dealer to your sons and 
your daughters" was fundamental, but harmless, error). Neither is this a case 
involving the prosecutor's questioning of a victim for the purpose of evoking 
sympathy. Compare State v. Peite, 122 ldaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 
1992) (prosecutor's question of the victim asking her to explain how hard the 
rape has been on her improperly evoked juror sympathy, but was not prejudicial 
to the defendant). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor told the jury it was 
responsible for protecting the community. Compare State v. Baruth, 107 ldaho 
651, 691 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984) (prosecutor's comments that "the entire 
criminal justice system" as well as the defendant was on trial and that "you [the 
jury] are the only thing standing between the people of the community and Mr. 
Baruth robbing or doing anything else he chooses to anyone else" constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct, but was harmless error). 
The prosecutor's request of the jury in this case to "show ... the system 
works ... by weighing the evidence and returning a just and correct verdict" did 
not "encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based upon sympathy" for the 
victim. That the prosecutor asked the jury to fulfill its responsibility to reach a 
verdict based upon the evidence presented did not render the comment 
misconduct, nor was his request of the jury improper. See State v. Larsen, 81 
ldaho 90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) ("The general rule is that argument by the 
prosecuting attorney merely urging the jurors in a criminal prosecution to do their 
duty, and to enforce the criminal law generally or the particular law under which 
the prosecution was instituted, does not constitute a ground for a new trial or a 
reversal but is within the range of proper argument.") (citation omitted). Rather, 
the prosecutor's argument in this case was a proper comment that, based on the 
evidence, the jury should "hold the defendant accountable." 
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's argument could be deemed 
improper, it does not amount to fundamental error. Asking the jury to "[slhow her 
[Laurie] the system works," did not so infect the trial with unfairness that it 
violated due process because it could not have influenced the jury to convict 
Schultz of felony domestic battery without sufficient evidence, particularly since 
the jury could have believed conviction of a lesser offense would be adequate to 
give Laurie "hope" and "[slhow her the system works." 
Because Schultz's claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first 
time on appeal do not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not 
entitled to relief. 
E. The Prosecutor's Comments, Even If Fundamental Error. Do Not Entitle 
Schultz To A Reversal Of His Conviction 
Even if the prosecutor's comment during closing argument rose to the 
level of fundamental error, such error does not automatically require reversal of 
Schultz's conviction. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 
(2007) (prosecutorial misconduct, though fundamental error, was nevertheless 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). "An error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and 
argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same 
result absent the error." Id. (citing State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 ldaho 908, 71 
P.3d 1055 (2003)); see also Phillips, 144 ldaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 589. Although 
Schultz argues otherwise, a review of the record in this case shows that any error 
committed by the prosecutor during closing argument was, at worst, harmless. 
In light of the evidence presented during Schultz's two-day trial, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument 
contributed to Schultz's conviction. The jury was presented with overwhelming 
evidence which supported, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's finding that 
Schultz was guilty of committing felony domestic battery. Laurie Morrill's 
testimony was corroborated by the physical evidence of her injuries, as well as 
other witnesses, including the testimony of Deputy Moore (#33256 Trial Tr., 
pp.5-26), Lieutenant Kindig (#33256 Trial Tr., pp.32-57) and the EMT who 
examined her (#33256 Trial Tr., pp.59-66). The record provides no support for a 
conclusion that the jury would have reached a different outcome, absent the 
prosecutor's comments during closing argument. 
Given the amount of evidence connecting Schultz to the injuries suffered 
by Laurie Morrill, if there was any misconduct rising to the level of fundamental 
error, the error was harmless. Schultz has failed to show any basis for reversal 
of his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court dismiss Schultz's appeal as 
untimely, or in the alternative, affirm Schultz's conviction and sentence for felony 
domestic battery. 
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